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ABSTRACT
The current state of digital forensic investigation is continuously challenged by the rapid
technological changes, the increase in the use of digital devices (both the heterogeneity and
the count), and the sheer volume of data that these devices could contain. Although data
privacy protection is not a performance measure, however, preventing privacy violations
during the digital forensic investigation, is also a big challenge. With a perception that the
completeness of investigation and the data privacy preservation are incompatible with each
other, the researchers have provided solutions to address the above-stated challenges that
either focus on the effectiveness of the investigation process or the data privacy preserva-
tion. However, a comprehensive approach that preserves data privacy without affecting the
capabilities of the investigator or the overall efficiency of the investigation process is still an
open problem. In the current work, the authors have proposed a digital forensic framework
that uses case information, case profile data and expert knowledge for automation of the
digital forensic analysis process; utilizes machine learning for finding most relevant pieces of
evidence; and maintains data privacy of non-evidential private files. All these operations are
coordinated in a way that the overall efficiency of the digital forensic investigation process
increases while the integrity and admissibility of the evidence remain intact. The framework
improves validation which boosts transparency in the investigation process. The framework
also achieves a higher level of accountability by securely logging the investigation steps. As
the proposed solution introduces notable enhancements to the current investigative prac-
tices more like the next version of Digital Forensics, the authors have named the framework
‘Digital Forensics 2.0’, or ‘DF 2.0’ in short.
Keywords: Digital Forensics Framework, Automation, Data Privacy, Machine Learning
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1. INTRODUCTION
Digital forensic science has evolved a lot
since the first Digital Forensics Research
Workshop (Palmer et al., 2001). However,
there have been some research problems that
are continuously challenging the researchers
and practitioners till date.
The first and foremost challenge is the ever
growing data storage capacity of digital de-
vices (Quick & Choo, 2014). The large vol-
ume of data increases the time requirements
for the data acquisition and the data anal-
ysis processes (Lillis, Becker, O’Sullivan, &
Scanlon, 2016). Moreover, since the num-
ber of cases that involve digital evidence in
some form is on the rise all over the world,
the digital forensic investigators are facing a
pressing need for reducing the investigation
time per case (Al Awadhi, Read, Marring-
ton, & Franqueira, 2015).
The second challenge is thrown by the in-
creasing diversity of digital devices that are
becoming available in the market (Hossain,
Fotouhi, & Hasan, 2015). Digital foren-
sic personnel have to continuously strive for
finding new ways (through software as well
as hardware means) to acquire and ana-
lyze such devices (Inspectorate, 2015). The
software diversity deals with variety of file-
types, ever evolving Operating Systems, the
huge pool of innovative applications, and
other software advancements aimed at con-
temporary digital devices. On the hardware
front, diversity of sensors, chips, circuit mod-
ules and other hardware units that produce
unique data streams presents a challenge for
digital forensics. Although providing a so-
lution to each instance of the above-stated
diversity challenges is a one-time effort for
the practitioners and researchers; however,
overall the rate at which these parameters
change keeps them on their toes.
Furthermore, people tend to use separate
devices for communication, entertainment
and productivity purposes. Hence the num-
ber of individuals who own and use more
than one digital devices at a time is in-
creasing (Facebook-Business, 2014). An-
other study by Facebook in 2016 reveals that
94% teens in France and 98% teens in Ger-
many own multiple devices (Facebook-IQ,
2016). The Pew Research Center published a
report in 2015 stating that around 36% of US
adults own all three devices, namely a smart-
phone, a computer, and a tablet (Anderson,
2015). Another survey by Pew in January
2017 has revealed that 77% of US adult
population owns a smartphone, 78% owns
a desktop or laptop, and 51% owns a tablet
computer (Pew-Research, 2017). Although
the survey presents separate figures for the
three devices, one can safely assume that
individuals who own multiple devices are a
significant part of the US population today.
The people in other regions of the world ei-
ther share similar statistics or would achieve
the same trends in the near future. The rise
in the number of devices owned per person
would increase the average number of ex-
hibits seized in a new case, thus increasing
the respective investigation time and efforts.
Even after finding their ways to acquire
and analyze the new digital devices, the dig-
ital forensic examiners face the third chal-
lenge from rapid technological advancements
that change the rules of the game now and
then (Garfinkel, 2010). The technological
progress that poses a challenge to investi-
gators is the increasing list of devices that
are going digital every day, thanks to the
novel hardware innovations. The devices in
everyday use which get equipped with com-
The current work is an extension of the 
paper which was presented at “The ADFSL 
2018 Conference on Digital Forensics, Secu-
rity and Law” on May 17, 2018 at the Uni-
versity of Texas at San Antonio, TX, USA.
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putational, communication and digital stor-
age capability, commonly referred to as In-
ternet of Things (IoT), pose new investiga-
tive challenges to the digital forensic pro-
cess (Oriwoh, Jazani, Epiphaniou, & Sant,
2013). Any investigation involving such de-
vices would require knowledge about how the
data is produced, stored and communicated
to or from these devices.
The fourth challenge, which is not directly
connected to the functioning of the digital
forensic investigation, is data privacy pro-
tection during the digital forensic investi-
gation (Aminnezhad, Dehghantanha, & Ab-
dullah, 2012). The Digital forensic inves-
tigators always get full access to the con-
tents of seized storage media which accord-
ing to them is necessary for achieving com-
pleteness. Apart from containing potential
evidence files, the seized storage media also
contain owner’s private data which may be
sensitive at times like private/family pictures
and videos, business related digital docu-
ments, medical diagnostic or treatment re-
ports, commercial software with license in-
formation, and much more. Investigator’s
open access to these private files is a threat
to owner’s data privacy (Verma, Govindaraj,
& Gupta, 2016).
The data privacy protection is also re-
lated to need for transparency in the digital
forensic investigation that ensures only case-
relevant data are accessed from the seized
media and remaining private files are not
affected (Dehghantanha & Franke, 2014).
There is a pressing need for finding means
to fix accountability of the investigator in
case a data privacy breach happens during
the investigation. The two sister agencies
that work in close collaboration with digital
forensic personnel, namely the Police and the
regular forensic laboratories, are facing diffi-
culties related to transparency and account-
ability. The case of Annie Dookhan is a good
example of the same (Driscoll, 2014). To the
best of authors’ knowledge, there are no re-
ported instances of professional misconduct
against digital forensic investigators till date;
however, it is high time that the community
should adopt self-regulatory ways to improve
the transparency as well as the accountabil-
ity of the digital investigation process.
Apart from the challenges listed above,
some researchers have predicted that mov-
ing forward the field of digital forensic
would start diverging into more special-
ized sub-fields (Garfinkel, 2015). The sub-
fields would require the investigators to pos-
sess expert knowledge of the respective sub-
domain. The digital forensic laboratories
would need an investigation mechanism that
could allow different experts to work to-
gether on a given case. There is one more
aspect to learning for digital forensic ex-
aminers which aims to capture the psycho-
logical, cultural and social characteristics of
the people who commit computer related
crimes (M. K. Rogers, 2011). Researchers
have been trying to capture such parameters
that could help in digital forensics investiga-
tion process (M. Rogers, 1999; M. K. Rogers,
Seigfried, & Tidke, 2006).
The digital forensic frameworks to date
have focused on addressing the above-stated
challenges either in separation or well-
defined scenarios with controlled environ-
mental conditions. In the current work,
the authors have proposed a new digital
forensic framework that incorporates foren-
sic image preprocessing, tool-independent
automation, machine learning based filtra-
tion of most relevant evidence and their pri-
vacy level evaluation to address the above-
stated challenges. The framework proposes
a new way in which the state of the art dig-
ital forensic research and systems could be
combined in one place to realize the follow-
ing.
• Increased investigative efficiency by re-
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ducing the investigation time and efforts
• Improved investigative accuracy by us-
ing multiple tools at the same time
• Better investigative planning via au-
tomation
• Improved validation
• Data privacy protection for forensically
non-relevant private files
• Enhanced transparency and account-
ability
• Building expert knowledge for forensic
investigation, education, training, and
multi-agency collaborations
2. PROPOSED
SOLUTION
enable fast and parallel operations in suc-
cessive investigation phases. In case physi-
cal devices (exhibits) are available, then the
imaging for these seized devices is started
simultaneously with the data removal and
reformatting. The authors call the above
procedure ‘forensic preprocessing’ as it pre-
cedes the actual processing for finding evi-
dence files (the analysis phase). The prepro-
cessing aims to rearrange and consolidate the
data available in all of the submitted foren-
sic images (provided in any of the popular
formats) so that forensic tools could read
the data concurrently. However, all prepro-
cessing techniques and methods should en-
sure that the output produced by them is
compatible with all digital forensic software
tools. The section 3 discusses preprocessing
in details.
The next step runs the ‘Automated
Digital Forensic Processing’ module.
The module takes inputs from the CCI
document, a case-specific command list,
and some already known exception com-
mands. The ‘Case Profile Commands
(CPC)’ database contains a list of com-
mands that a specific digital forensic tool
would require while performing a case spe-
cific job under a particular hardware de-
ployment. These commands listed in CPC-
database ensure that the planning of in-
vestigative steps is complete and consistent
with respect to a particular type of case. For
example, in the case of a financial fraud in-
vestigation, the CPC-database will contain
commands for say Encase tool, version 7.0
running on a Windows 8.1 workstation, to
perform a keyword search job (with a list of
unique operations, called job-sections, refer
figure 2) on a Linux machine’s forensic-image
that has an EXT4 file-system. The CPC-
database contains the comprehensive collec-
tion of commands and scripts, to complete
distinct tasks, which are executed by the list
of forensic software tools already provided by
The framework takes forensic exhibits and 
images (of desktops, laptops, smartphones, 
tablets, or other devices that store data), 
network logs, memory dumps, and all other 
sources of digital storage as input (refer to 
figure 1). As the inputs proceed to the next 
phase of ‘Forensic Preprocessing’, the 
investigator fills in all case related facts into 
a document called Current Case Informa-
tion (CCI). The document consists of foren-
sically relevant data that is unique to the 
case under investigation, like individual key-
words, timelines, and other useful informa-
tion. After that, the investigator also pro-
vides the list of digital forensic tools, with 
their respective version numbers. All input 
images are processed to remove forensically 
irrelevant data like files listed in NSRL (Seo, 
Lim, Choi, Chang, & Lee, 2009) and dupli-
cate files (Neuner, Mulazzani, Schrittwieser, 
& Weippl, 2015; Scanlon, 2016). The foren-
sic image formatting is also changed, with-
out breaking the integrity of the input, to
Page 16 c© 2019 ADFSL
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Figure 1. Digital Forensic 2.0 framework flowchart
the investigator.
The Exception Commands (EC) database
consists of command structure similar to
that of the CPC-database with a distinction
that these commands aim to find evidence
files that could otherwise be missed during
the initial run of forensic tools. For exam-
ple, all PDF attachments received on Gmail
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tion 4 discusses this in more details.
The results of Automated Digital Foren-
sic Processing are passed on to the next
step (Relevance vs. Privacy Quotient).
Here, with the help of machine learning al-
gorithms, a relevance score for all potential
evidence files (obtained from the automation
module) is calculated. Similarly, the privacy
quotient for these files is also calculated si-
multaneously. The investigator is then pre-
sented with a finite list of the top scoring
relevant files. The investigator can analyze
these files to decide whether these evidence
files are sufficient to prove or disprove the
case. If the investigator wants, she could
keep on requesting the next lot of most rel-
evant files for further examination, till the
list of potential evidence gets exhausted. As
soon as the investigator gets sufficient evi-
dence from the relevance list, she may stop
the investigation and generate the case re-
port. However, if the investigator feels that
the artifacts enlisted in relevance list are not
sufficient, she is free to override the filters
and start over the automation module.
The framework also incorporates a Se-
cure Logging System (from start of the
investigation till it stops) where all actions
and decisions of the investigator are chrono-
logically logged into a secure place. The
safe storage for these logs could either be
a hardened local server or a reliable cloud
space where the investigator has no chance of
tampering with them (Barik, Gupta, Sinha,
Mishra, & Mazumdar, 2007; Verma, Govin-
daraj, & Gupta, 2014). Since the investiga-
tor may be required to explain her actions in
case any privacy breach or some foul play is
either doubted or reported. The secure log-
ging ensures that the accountability of the
investigator is fixed when such a situation
arises. A brief discussion on the same is pre-
sented in section 7.
Automation used in the framework simpli-
fies repeatability of the investigation process,
while being viewed by the receiver’s browser 
generates one PNG image for each page 
of the attached document (Verma, Gupta, 
Sarkar, & Gupta, 2012). So, when the 
user login into their account and check their 
emails with PDF files as attachments, the 
PNG images corresponding to each page of 
the viewed PDF document get loaded into 
the browser cache. These images could be 
extracted from any of these three sources; 
the cache on hard-disk drive, the RAM dump 
or the Hibernation file of the system. A dig-
ital forensic investigator should fill in com-
mand (or scripts) to parse these PNG files, 
from the sources described above, in the EC-
database.
The EC-database is a collection of all such 
exclusive commands which can find targeted 
content. In other words, the database con-
tains expert knowledge which has been ac-
quired over time from individual experience, 
careful observations, and novel research ef-
forts. In case two forensic labs enjoy a 
considerable amount of trust and mutual 
understanding, they could share their EC-
databases. The sharing will give the examin-
ers on both sides the opportunity to upgrade 
their knowledge and enhance their capabil-
ities. In case all forensic labs in a province 
or state agree to share their EC-databases, 
it could become a good collection of valuable 
regional (demographic) forensic insights.
Depending on the investigation needs and 
the availability of forensic tools, the automa-
tion module can work with both the open 
source as well as commercial digital foren-
sic tools. The framework requires that the 
forensically relevant files processed by the 
tools have a uniformly high level of data ab-
straction. For example, the tools should ex-
pands all compound files (at a lower level of 
data abstraction) to extract the contained 
files (at a higher level of data abstraction) 
before these files could be passed on to the 
next level of scrutiny by the framework. Sec-
Page 18 c© 2019 ADFSL
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which proves to be very helpful in validating
the investigation outcomes. Especially, for
the Technical Validation which aims to
check whether all steps followed by the inves-
tigator fulfill the goals of the investigation.
Automation together with the secure-logging
will help the digital forensic community to
study and optimize the investigative tech-
niques followed by examiners. Repeatability
and easy validation could improve the over-
all transparency of the investigative process.
The framework also ensures a three-way er-
ror reduction mechanism using automation.
Firstly, the automation reduces the chances
of human error that may happen at any time.
Secondly, the automation ensures that no
step is missed from the investigative plan-
ning which remains consistent for a partic-
ular type of case. Thirdly, the automation
ensures that no evidence file is missed due
to limitations of a particular tool since re-
sults from different forensic tools are com-
bined to present a comprehensive list of po-
tential pieces of evidence. The above solu-
tion will keep the investigative powers of the
investigator intact with good chances that
her overall efficiency gets improved.
2.1 Setup
The proposed framework needs a hardware
infrastructure that could provide both high-
performance computational power as well as
high-speed data storage and access. A ro-
bust and capable software should also sup-
port the hardware to realize both an efficient
parallel processing and a powerful data man-
agement mechanism. Another requirement
for the software component of the framework
is its compatibility to run applications and
programs from all publicly available software
platforms. So, all state of the art Operat-
ing System dependent and Operating Sys-
tem independent digital forensic tools, which
are capable of working on various digital de-
vices, irrespective of whether they are closed
source (commercial) or open source could be
deployed on the proposed framework.
All the forensic tools and applications that
are installed on the framework should be
able to receive command-line instructions.
Since most of the open source digital foren-
sic tools take command-line inputs, they can
easily be attached to the framework. Since
all commercial tools are closed source, it is
the responsibility of their developers to pro-
vide a command-line support for their re-
spective tools. Although there are some
tools like EnCase, which accept scripts to
automate some investigative tasks, there is
still a segment of commercial tools that do
not support automation. The tools that do
not provide any support for automation can
not be used with the proposed framework.
Depending on the requirement, the pro-
posed framework can be set up on any of
the following configurations:
1. Beowulf Cluster in a laboratory- best
suited for digital forensic laboratory en-
vironments where a suitable number
of processing nodes could be selected
based on the budget and investigative
load (Ayers, 2009). A Beowulf cluster
file system provides support for high-
performance data access and storage.
The processing speed and efficiency of a
Beowulf cluster in a laboratory setting
are better as compared to a distributed
systems deployment or a cloud deploy-
ment of the same configuration.
2. On the Cloud - a private cloud with
a strict access control could be a use-
ful option for an investigation agency,
which has multiple departments located
at same or different geographical loca-
tions (Van Baar, van Beek, & van Eijk,
2014). Alternatively, an agency could
also rent virtual machines on a public
cloud having comparatively high pro-
cessing and data storage capabilities.
c© 2019 ADFSL Page 19
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The catch with cloud-based deployment
is the dependency on limited upload and
download speeds. However, if the net-
work speeds are favorable, the cloud-
hosted framework could enhance remote
investigations capabilities where investi-
gators could simultaneously work on the
same case.
3. Distributed Systems - could also be
used to deploy the framework with the
processing power comparable to above-
mentioned deployment models. How-
ever, the data access speed, the par-
allelization in processing, and the file
system capabilities would be relatively
more complicated and hard to man-
age (Richard III & Roussev, 2006).
suit the analysis requirements of the given
case. The information from the CCI docu-
ment and the tools list is used by the prepro-
cessing module to fine-tune its operations.
The primary aim of the preprocessing
module is to change the data formatting of
the forensic images (without breaking their
integrity) so that the digital forensic tools
attached to the framework could perform
highly efficient parallelized operations. The
secondary aim is to remove forensically ir-
relevant data from the forensic images which
include files listed in NSRL (Seo et al., 2009)
and duplicate files (Neuner et al., 2015;
Scanlon, 2016).
In case physical devices (exhibits) are sub-
mitted instead of their forensic images, then
the imaging for these seized devices is started
simultaneously with the data reformatting
and redundancy removal. All preprocessing
techniques and methods should ensure that
the output produced by them is compatible
with the digital forensic software tools due
to be used in the automation phase.
The data formatting operation should
keep the integrity of the forensic images in-
tact, and hence there should be no impact
on the admissibility of the forensic evidence
extracted out of the newly formatted data.
4. AUTOMATION
The Automated Digital Forensic Process-
ing module aims to carry out a thorough
forensic analysis of the forensic images to
collect all case related potential pieces of
evidence without any human intervention.
The module uses the Current Case Infor-
mation (CCI) document and queries both
the Case Profile Commands (CPC) database
as well as the Exception Commands (EC)
database (refer figure 3).
The CPC-database is populated by query-
ing two tables, namely the Job-Sections ta-
ble and the Tool-Selection table (positioned
3. PREPROCESSING
The Forensic Preprocessing module is the 
first component of the proposed framework 
that operates on the forensic images. The 
authors call the module ‘forensic preprocess-
ing’ as it precedes the process of finding evi-
dence files (the analysis phase). The prepro-
cessing aims to rearrange and consolidate the 
data available in all of the submitted foren-
sic images so that forensic tools could read 
the data concurrently.
Before preprocessing could begin, the in-
vestigator is required to fill in all case re-
lated details into the Current Case Infor-
mation (CCI) document. The document 
consists of forensically relevant information 
about the case under investigation, like the 
type of case, the name of the case, suspect’s 
information, keywords of interest, timelines 
of interest, targeted file types, and other 
valuable information(refer figure 2). After 
filling the CCI document, the investigator 
also provides the list of digital forensic tools, 
with their respective version numbers, which 
are installed on her forensic system and best
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Figure 2. Investigator’s input to the framework
at top right and bottom of figure 2 respec-
tively). The Job-Sections table contains in-
formation about various jobs and sub-jobs
(the author calls them job-sections) that
are carried out by the digital forensic tools.
The job name specifies a particular task of
forensic importance which is used in a digital
investigation, for example ‘keyword search’.
The keyword search can further be divided
into small tasks, like searching keywords in
all text files (let us call it job-section 1). Sim-
ilarly, searching for keywords in PDF files is
another sub-task (let us call it job-section 2).
Likewise, a comprehensive list of well-defined
subtasks for a particular job can be popu-
lated. If we consider the keyword search job
with reference to a particular case (say Fi-
nancial Fraud), the investigator can identify
the list of job-sections that are useful for the
investigation of that case.
The Job-Sections table contains this map-
ping for all type of known case types, respec-
tive jobs that are needed to be performed for
these case types and the comprehensive list
of job-sections for the same.
The Tool-Selection table contains tool ver-
sion specific commands or scripts to imple-
ment job-sections from the Job-Sections ta-
ble. All of the instructions are stored with
respective parameters.
The CPC-database is populated with
case-specific commands recognized by the
tools, specified by the investigator, for com-
pleting a collection of small investigative
jobs. The values obtained from the CCI
document include specific terms including
names of the suspects, names of the compa-
nies they are associated with, names of their
partners, names of the projects they have
handled, and more.
The CPC-database holds all job specific
directives that may belong to more than one
type of case profiles; for example, keyword
search is one job which has application in
a variety of cases. The keyword search job
can be performed by various digital foren-
sic software tools. However, the search tech-
nique implementation along with the key-
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Figure 3. Automated digital forensic processing module.
for a Financial Fraud case type where a Win-
dows 10 machine with EnCase version 7.1
installed on it is available, and the foren-
sic image is a Hard Disk Drive with Linux
installation needs to be examined, then the
first database entry for keyword search could
fetch the command(s) with corresponding
parameters and options (if applicable). For
simplicity of understanding the authors have
all columns of the databases in Figure 3; oth-
erwise, the databases could be normalized
further.
Even after processing the forensic image
with a variety of digital forensic software
tools, there are some crucial evidence that
might escape the examiner’s scrutiny. For
example, with the surge in mobile phone us-
word list(s) would differ depending on the 
tool specifications and the case profile re-
spectively.
The collection of all jobs that are per-
formed for a particular case type is in pub-
lic knowledge. Moreover, how a particular 
job could be carried out by various digital 
forensic software tools could also be docu-
mented. There are tool-specific commands 
for performing a particular job which could 
take specific parameters and options based 
on the case type and information from the 
CCI document.
All of the above information is captured 
in the databases, as shown in Figure 3 that 
makes the automation possible. For exam-
ple, if the job requirement is keyword search
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age people have started taking pictures of
various documents that they use in their
daily lives. Examples include tickets, dif-
ferent identity cards, business cards, bank
checks, mark-sheets and sometimes user-
name and passwords for important on-line
accounts. The forensic tools that search for
keywords only focus on files that have tex-
tual data, and would not be able to search
for images that have some written content
until and unless they are instructed to do
so. Experienced investigators have knowl-
edge of such intricate details, like running
OCR on suspected images along with key-
word search, or filtering out the potential
pictures by their metadata in case the OCR
engine fails. These approaches could help
the investigation by obtaining crucial evi-
dence on the first run. The proposed frame-
work stores these intricate details in the EC-
database. The commands include imple-
mentation tricks and techniques that come
from knowledge gathered by forensic experts
over time as well as research breakthroughs.
Structurally the database is similar to CPC-
database (refer figure 3).
The working of the automation module
(especially the structure of CPC-database)
which is presented above is inspired by
the work of (Karabiyik & Aggarwal, 2014).
However, to the best of authors’ knowledge,
the conceptualization of the Exception Com-
mands database is a fresh contribution.
4.1 Design
An Expert System could be used to de-
sign the automation engine. The rules
of conducting forensic analysis could be
stored in the CPC-database. Different vari-
ables that need to be considered like case
type, job specification, device type, respec-
tive OS and File-System versions, forensic
tool’s name/version, and respective com-
mands/parameters/options could be mod-
eled into the system.
4.2 Relevant vs.
Non-Relevant Files: First
level of data privacy
preservation
The outcome of the automated digital foren-
sic processing would give a list of files from
the forensic image(s) which are potential
pieces of evidence for the case under investi-
gation.
The automation module operations seg-
regate all files present in the forensic im-
age(s) into two classes, namely Forensi-
cally Relevant Files (FRF) and Foren-
sically Irrelevant Files (FIF). The FRF
advance to the next stages of the investiga-
tion, whereas the FIF is made inaccessible
to the investigator.
The denial of access to all files (includ-
ing the private files) which are present in
FIF group, is the first level of data pri-
vacy preservation ensured by the pro-
posed framework.
5. FORENSIC
RELEVANCE VS. DATA
PRIVACY
The data privacy aims to protect owner’s
personal information from falling into hands
of unauthorized people (Fischer-Hu¨bner,
2001) (OECD, 2002). Whereas, a digital
forensic investigation seeks to find all poten-
tial pieces of evidence that indicate a ma-
licious activity carried out in digital space
(Pollitt, 2004).
All files that are selected/ highlighted/ ex-
ported at the completion of the automation
module fall into the Forensically Relevant
Files (FRF) group. The number of files in
the FRF is still large enough for the investi-
gators to examine individually. Moreover, a
considerable number of owner’s private files
that do not qualify as concrete evidence are
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case under investigation. The classification
process needs to process data available in
the Evidence Features (EF) database (Fig-
ure 4). The EF-database takes information
about each file that is selected into FRF, and
some case specific information from the Cur-
rent Case Information (CCI) document.
5.1.1 Feature selection
The aim is to classify each file in the FRF
into a potentially-conclusive or a potentially-
indecisive piece of evidence. The informa-
tion stored in the EF-database correspond-
ing to each file, belonging to the FRF for a
particular case under investigation, acts as a
feature-set for a machine learning implemen-
tation. The features can come from:
1. The file’s metadata: includes infor-
mation like - File-Type; Time-Stamps;
File-Size; File-Address; File Containing
Folder Name; File Containing Folder
Depth; Access Control Permissions; and
Owner(s) of the File.
2. Source image and the automation mod-
ule: includes information like - Foren-
sic Tool that selected the file; More
than one Tool selected the file (Y/N);
Job-Type; Job-Section; Level of Data
Abstraction; Did the file got ex-
tracted from a compound file (Y/N);
Source Image Format; Source Image
File-System; Source Image Operating-
System; Source Image Storage Technol-
ogy.
3. Use of the Exception Commands: in-
cludes information like - Is a result of
Exception Command (Y/N); Number of
Exception Commands used; Exception
Command IDs.
4. The associated Current Case Informa-
tion: includes information like - Case-
ID; Case-type; Has Keywords of In-
terest (Y/N); Has Name from Suspect
also included in the FRF collection. Hence, 
finding actual evidence files from the FRF 
group is undoubtedly a massive manual ef-
fort, which further involves a significant risk 
of data privacy violations for the private files 
that do not have much of evidential value.
The proposed framework uses machine 
learning to determine the degree of relevance 
(details in subsection 5.1) as well as the level 
of privacy (details in subsection 5.2) for all 
files present in the FRF group. The inves-
tigator is presented with the top most rele-
vant files (say, a bunch of top 20 or top 50) 
for examination, with their respective level 
of privacy also marked on them.
The next set of most relevant files is not 
presented to the investigator until she ex-
amines the first bunch and feels that further 
investigation is needed. Only after the inves-
tigator raises an explicit request to the sys-
tem, the next bunch (succeeding 20 or 50) of 
files is presented for her scrutiny. The pro-
cess of request and grant continues until the 
investigator finds all actual evidence needed 
to resolve the case or the list of FRF gets ex-
hausted. In a rather unusual situation when 
the examiner feels that the automation mod-
ule should be rerun, the framework provides 
a provision of doing so too.
The above-stated mechanism, for present-
ing most relevant files in a bunch until the 
investigator finds concrete evidence to prove 
or disprove the case, also prevents privacy 
breach to an extent. The process could also 
be understood as the second level of data 
privacy preservation which is ensured by 
the proposed framework. Although the data 
privacy protection in this filtration process 
is not absolute, however, the data privacy of 
a large number of files belonging to FRF is 
significantly preserved.
5.1 Degree of Relevance
The proposed framework classifies files based 
on their degree of relevance to the current
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List (Y/N); Is File Type of Interest
(Y/N); Does Fall into Timeline of In-
terest (Y/N).
It is worthy to note that, the list of above-
stated features is not exhaustive and may
contain more features in each category. Also,
the order of features mentioned above does
not reflect their respective significance.
5.1.2 Data collection
The data collection happens when a case is
investigated using the framework. Two op-
tions that may be used by the investigating
agencies while doing the data collection are
discussed below:
1. Data collection for a particular type of
case: It includes collecting data while
investigating cases of the same kind.
For example, If an investigative agency
analyzes only Financial Frauds cases,
then all features collected in the Ev-
idence Features database will help in
forming a machine learning prediction
model most suited for financial fraud
cases. Creating a model for a particu-
lar kind of case is considerably easy be-
cause each case shares a high degree of
commonality in their respective feature
sets.
2. Data collection for all type of cases:
It includes collecting data while inves-
tigating cases of all kinds. The fea-
tures collected in the Evidence Features
database will form a machine learn-
ing prediction model that could find
potentially-conclusive evidence for any
given case. Creating a generic model
that can make predictions for any case
at hand is a difficult task as compared
to the previous option because the fea-
ture sets will have many variations.
5.1.3 Machine learning approach for
relevance
As already stated before, the machine learn-
ing solution aims to classify each file in the
FRF into either a Potentially Conclusive
(PC) or a Potentially Indecisive (PI)
evidence. Hence, to put it formally -
1. The machine learning approach ad-
dresses a two-class classification prob-
lem (a supervised learning technique).
The reason for choosing a supervised
learning approach is to learn from the
experience of the investigators who have
already solved similar cases. The frame-
work needs access to the case related
artifacts like the case information doc-
ument, the forensic image associated
with that case, information about the
tools that were used to solve the case,
and the list of actual evidence files that
concluded the investigation.
The first three artifacts (mentioned in
the previous paragraph) could be used
by the framework to collect feature
information about all the FRF files,
whereas the last object would act as the
ground truth for training. All actual
evidence that the investigator marks at
the completion of each case investiga-
tion help populating the last feature col-
umn that is helpful in training.
After training on some examples of
solved cases of the same type, the ma-
chine learning solution could start pre-
dicting for a new case. However, for
a generalized solution, the training set
should contain a considerable number of
examples of each type of cases that have
been solved by the investigative agency
before the solution could start predict-
ing.
2. The supervised learning approach could
be implemented using an ensemble
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Evidence 
Features 
Evidence 
No. 
Relevance 
Score 
Evidence-33 98
Evidence-52 96
Evidence-40 90
Evidence-16 90
… … 
Features Sourced 
from: 
1. File’s metadata
2. From automation
module
3. Exception Commands
4. Current Case
Information (CCI)
Figure 4. Degree of relevance for forensically
relevant files.
learning method like Decision tree or
Random Forest that give considerably
good results when the training data set
is less, and the feature set is relatively
strong.
The authors think the above-stated
learning methods are suitable for the
classification task (PC vs. PI) when
developing a prediction model for the
same type of cases with a relatively
small training dataset. However, if an
investigation agency that has a collec-
tion of a substantial number of cases
of the same type say hundred or more
cases of financial fraud, then they could
try other algorithms like Support Vector
Machine (SVM) and k-Nearest Neigh-
bors (kNN).
When a generic solution needs to be
created, an ample number of cases of
each type that the investigation agency
works on is required. However, if mul-
tiple agencies agree to share their EF-
databases and list of conclusive evidence
for respective cases, the aim of making
a generic prediction solution could be
achieved.
The machine learning approach finds PC
files and calculates a relevance score for each
of them. The files are then arranged from
highest relevance score to the lowest. The
framework ensures that only a bunch of most
relevant files are presented to the investiga-
tor and rest of the files are masked from her.
The investigator asks for the next bunch of
files if required. The process continues till
the investigator finds all conclusive pieces of
evidence or the list of FRF gets exhausted.
The machine learning solution’s efficiency in-
creases with the number of solved cases get-
ting incorporated into the training set.
5.1.4 Mathematical Formulation of
Relevance Score
Let the number of input cases be n and the
number of features corresponding to an in-
dividual file be x (from the EF-database).
C = {C1, C2, C3, ..., Cn}
Where, C represent the case vector. The
case instance Ci can be represented as a col-
lection of its respective Forensically Relevant
Files group (FRF).
Ci = {Fi1, Fi5, Fi7, . . . , Fij, . . .}
where, i ∈ (1 to n)
And, Fij is the j
th file in Ci’s FRF. Every
file in the above set can have a maximum of
x features, and the feature vector for Fij can
be represented as:
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fFij = {f 1ij, f 2ij, f 3ij, ..., fxij}
So, the case Ci together with its FRF and
respective feature vectors can be represented
in matrix form as:
Ci =

Fi1
Fi2
Fi3
.
.
Fij
.

=
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The input cases ground-truth evidence can
be represented as
E =

E1
E2
E3
.
Ei
.
En

and Ei accounts for the evidence vector cor-
responding to the ith case which was declared
solved after finding files having conclusive
evidence. For example, the evidence vector
will have a collection of files like
Ei = {Fi1, Fi3, Fi5, . . .}
where, F iles in Ei ⊂ Files in Ci
Here, the feature vector corresponding to the
evidence Ei would consist of the union of all
prominent features of files mentioned above.
fEi = fFi1 ∪ fFi3 ∪ fFi5 ∪ . . .
Let us assume that the features which get
selected are following
fEi = {f 1i1, f 5i1, f 9i3, f 15i5 , f 19i3 , f 21i5 , . . . , fxi1}
Since we have x input features, hence the
weight vector W can be represented as
W =

W1
W2
W3
.
.
.
Wx

and,
W = fn1(FeaturesMatrix, EvidenceV ector)
The Relevance Score (RS ) for each file
present in FRF can be computed as
RS = fn2(WeightV ector, FeaturesMatrix)
The computation of RS is followed by sort-
ing of the Potentially Conclusive(PC) files
from the highest relevance score to lower.
The files get clustered into various sets say p
number of sets and each set has m number
of files which can be represented as -
S = {S1, S2, S3, . . . , Sk, . . . , Sp}, and
Sk = {F1, F2, F3, . . . , Fl, . . . Fm}
The subsection 6.1.5 provides further infor-
mation about how machine learning algo-
rithms’ scored probabilities can be used for
sorting the PC files.
5.2 Privacy Quotient
The framework also identifies whether a file
is private or it contains any Personally Iden-
tifiable Information (PII) about the suspect.
The aim is to correlate the data privacy in-
formation for each file with their respective
evidence rating (from the previous subsec-
tion). The privacy information of each file
will not restrict the investigative capabilities
of the forensic examiner in any way. How-
ever, the privacy quotient of the individual
file would enable both the suspect and the
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legal authorities to assess the scale of data
privacy violation, if it happens during the
investigation process.
A specific module named Private and PII
Identification (p2i3) runs on all files belong-
ing to FRF (refer figure 1). The authors have
marked the p2i3-module as a separate en-
tity in the flow diagram; however, the mod-
ule could be a part of the automation engine
if some of the forensic tools support the re-
quired functionality. For example, the tool
EnCase (Version 7 and up) has the provision
of finding files that contain personal informa-
tion as well as artifacts containing Personally
Identifiable Information.
All files in the FRF group are examined
to determine whether they are private to the
suspect or contain any of her PII.
Privacy 
Features 
Evidence 
No. 
Privacy 
Category 
Evidence-33 PF
Evidence-52 PF
Evidence-40 NPF
Evidence-16 PCF
… … 
Features Sourced 
from: 
1. File’s metadata
2. From p2i3 module
3. Current Case
Information
Figure 5. Privacy quotient for forensically
relevant files.
5.2.1 Feature selection
The information stored in the Privacy Fea-
tures (PF) database acts a feature-set for
machine learning implementation to find
each file’s privacy quotient. The features are
described below:
1. Features from file’s metadata (same
as in the EF-database): It captures
information like - File-Type; Time-
Stamps; File-Size; File-Address; File
containing folder name; File contain-
ing folder depth; Access-Control per-
missions; Owner(s) of the file.
2. Features from the source image and
the p2i3 module: It captures infor-
mation like - Source image format;
Source image File-System; Source im-
age Operating-System; Source image
storage technology; Is the file a private
file (Y/N); Type of the private infor-
mation identified; More than one type
of private information present (Y/N);
Does the file contain any PII (Y/N);
Type of PII identified; More than one
PII present (Y/N).
3. Features from the CCI document: it
captures information like - Case-ID;
Case-type; Has keywords of interest
(Y/N); Has name(s) from the suspects
list (Y/N); Is the File-Type of interest
(Y/N); Does the file fall into Timeline
of Interest (Y/N).
It may be noted that, the list of above-
stated features is not exhaustive and may
contain more features in each category. Also,
the order of the features does not reflect their
respective significance.
The data collection part of the privacy rat-
ing solution is same as that of the evidence
rating solution (refer sub-subsection 5.1.2).
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5.2.2 Machine learning approach for
privacy quotient
The aim of the machine learning implemen-
tation in the privacy solution is to categorize
files from the FRF group into three groups;
namely, the Private Files (PF), PII Con-
taining Files (PCF), and Non-Private Files
(NPF). Hence, to put it formally -
1. The machine learning approach ad-
dresses a clustering problem. An unsu-
pervised machine learning approach is
used to categorize the files into one of
three clusters (PF, PCF, and NPF ) as
described above.
2. The unsupervised learning approach
can use a k-means algorithm to segre-
gate the files into these three clusters.
However, there are good chances that
the third cluster NPF could get more
than 35% of sample population (files
from FRF), making the k-means clus-
ter analysis unfruitful. In such a situ-
ation the solution needs one extra level
of processing.
The k-means algorithm should be
started with a higher value, preferably
3 to 4 times the value of the number
of required clusters “n” (which is cur-
rently 3 ). An inflated value of n would
produce 9 to 12 clusters, each of which
would comply with the condition of hav-
ing the sample population between 5 -
35%.
A secondary level of clustering on top
of these results (using the Hierarchical
Clustering) will club them into the fi-
nal three clusters namely, PF, PCF, and
NPF.
6. MACHINE
LEARNING
IMPLEMENTATION
The authors present a prototype (proof of
concept) implementation of ML techniques
for predicting the evidential value of a file
(subsection 6.1), as well as assessing the pri-
vacy quotient of the file (subsection 6.2).
6.1 Prediction of evidential
value: Classification
In the absence of a real-world digital foren-
sic case, the authors decided to choose the
‘Hacking-Case’ for the prototype implemen-
tation. The Hacking-Case files are avail-
able on NIST’s Computer Forensics Ref-
erence Data Sets (CFReDS) project web-
site (CFReDS, acc. Mar’18).
6.1.1 The setup
The authors downloaded the EnCase images
(two .E01 files) from the Hacking Case page
on CFReDS website. The rest of the steps
are enumerated below:
1. The authors collected the metadata in-
formation about all the files contained
in the forensic image of the given case.
The authors used the EnPack ‘flat-
file-export-(v4-0-0).enpack’ (Key, acc.
Mar’18) in EnCase V7 to export around
sixty six columns of metadata informa-
tion corresponding to each file. The ta-
ble 1 provides selected fields produced
by the above-mentioned EnPack. The
authors collect all metadata values in
a CSV-file and name it as All-File-
Dataset (AFD).
2. The authors asked five digital forensic
investigators working in a private digi-
tal forensic laboratory to find answers to
20 investigative questions out of the 31
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(listed in Appendix:A), which are men-
tioned on the website. The authors re-
duced the number of questions for sim-
plifying the analysis process for the in-
vestigators. The authors asked each in-
vestigator to mark a set of files as po-
tential evidence. The authors collected
all five sets of marked evidence, where
one investigator’s set may have a slight
difference in the number of entries as
compared to entries in the marked sets
of her colleagues. The above-stated sce-
nario is ideal to collect all potential ev-
idence files for the given case because
the union of all marked sets from multi-
ple investigators would provide a com-
prehensive list of answers for each inves-
tigative question.
3. The authors asked the investigators to
align their tools (EnCase) with the
time-settings of the image before they
start looking for answers. The same
time settings would ensure that marked
files collected from all the investigators
have consistent time values.
4. The investigators were asked to note
down the total time they spent on the
case during the investigation.
5. After the investigation process got
over, the authors asked the investi-
gators to export the metadata infor-
mation of their respective marked ev-
idence files (using the flat-file-export-
(v4-0-0).enpack) into respective Poten-
tial Evidence Dataset (PED).
6. The authors first collated all values
generated by the five investigators in
one place and removed the multiple en-
tries. In other words, all PEDs were
merged into one CSV file, and du-
plicate rows were removed. The au-
thors named this file as All-Potential-
Evidence-Dataset (APED). The rows
in APED are unique and present the
union of all the files that were marked
by the investigators as potential pieces
of evidence.
7. The authors added a new column to
APED named ‘IsEvidence’; which con-
tained a binary value ‘1’ for all the rows
signaling that all entries in the table
were potential evidence files.
8. At the same time, the authors also
added ‘IsEvidence’ column to the AFD,
and made all entries ‘0’; asserting
that all entries in the AFD were non-
evidence files.
9. Finally, the authors merged all entries of
the APED into the AFD, and removed
the duplicate rows where the ‘IsEvi-
dence’ value was ‘0’. The final CSV be-
came the dataset which was used in ML
implementation.
It is worthy to note that some files, marked
by the investigators which were registry val-
ues, while exported to their respective PED’s
did not had any of their timestamps (like
Accessed, Acquired, Created, Modified, or
Deleted) except Written. The authors pop-
ulated the missing timestamps of these reg-
istry entries using the time details of their
parent files in the final dataset.
6.1.2 The dataset
As already mentioned in the previous subsec-
tion, the authors have used flat-file-export-
(v4-0-0).enpack (Key, acc. Mar’18) to ex-
port all files present in the Hacking-Case En-
Case images. There were a total of 12,190
files present in the case. After exporting the
metadata of all these files using the EnPack,
the authors found that only 11, 937 entries
were populated in the output file (AFD).
The exporting script ignored 98 files which
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Table 1. The reduced set of columns present in the dataset.
Type Columns
Time Accessed, Acquired, Created, Deleted, Modified, Written
String Category, Description, EvidenceFile, Extension, Extraction Status,
ItemType, Name, ShortName, PrimaryDevice, Protected, Signature,
SignatureResult, SignatureTag
Numeric ExtentCount, FileID, InitializedSize, LogicalSize, PhysicalLocation,
PhysicalSector, PhysicalSize, UniqueOffset
Addresses FullPath, Matching File Path, OriginalPath, SymLink
Alpha-Numeric GUID, MD5Hash, SHA1Hash, StartingExtent
Binary HasAttributeList, HasPermList, IsCompressed B, IsDeleted B, Is-
Disk B, IsDuplicate B, IsEncrypted B, IsFolder B, IsHardLinked B,
IsHidden B, IsIndexed B, IsInternal B, IsMountedVolume B, IsOver-
written B, IsPicture B, IsSparse B, IsStream B, IsVolume B, WasPro-
cessed B, IsEvidence
had a physical size of zero bytes. Moreover,
120 archive/composite files were also skipped
by the script during the process.
The authors intentionally removed one
row from the database, which had the ad-
dress ‘Dell Latitude CPi\C.’ Encase adds
all images in a case under an imaginary ‘C’
folder, which acts as the root folder for that
case. Since the ‘C’ folder entry does not have
any evidential value or actual existence in
the real case, the authors decided to remove
the same. Hence, the total count of entries
in the AFD database decreases to 11, 972.
The authors then carried out the EnCase
processing on case image and exported the
metadata again. The processing of the image
recovered metadata entries corresponding to
120 archive/composite files that were missed
earlier.
After combining the metadata entries
(PEDs) obtained from the five digital foren-
sic investigators, the authors got a total of
259 metadata entries for all marked poten-
tial evidence files in the APED.
It may be noted that the forensic inves-
tigators also marked registry entries as evi-
dence files, whose metadata information are
not present in the initial forensic image. The
EnCase expands the registry files (like SAM)
and enables the investigator to mark the en-
tries within. There are a total of 23 registry
entries that are included in the APED.
Finally, the authors merged the entries
from the APED into the AFD, and obtained
the final dataset, with a total of 12,115 en-
tries.
The number of columns exported by the
EnPack is 66; however, the authors removed
some of the columns that hold information
specific to EnCase or the EnPack. For ex-
ample, columns like ‘Codepage’, ‘Complex-
ity’, ‘Entropy’, ‘Tags’, and ‘Recepiant’ are
EnCase specific columns which are not so
tightly related to the actual file. Similarly,
columns like ‘Output filename’ is an exam-
ple of the EnPack specific column which is
not related to the file.
Moreover, there are some other columns
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lems. The authors have used seven al-
gorithms, namely - Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM), Two-class Logistic Regression,
Deep SVM, Decision Forest, Decision Jun-
gle, Boosted Decision Tree, and Neural Net-
works. There is no specific reason for the se-
lection of these seven algorithms, and other
algorithms can also be used on the dataset
to accomplish the required classification job.
The confusion matrix of each of these algo-
rithms is presented in table 2. The positive
labeled entries (marked evidence files) in the
dataset are significantly less than the nega-
tive labeled entries (where ‘IsEvidence’ value
is ‘0’), so the accuracy values of the algo-
rithms do not reflect each algorithm’s actual
performance. Hence, the authors have also
incorporated the Equal Error Rate (EER)
of the respective algorithms in the results
(table 2). The lower the EER, the better
the performance. The ROC curves of all
these algorithms are plotted in figure6 for
easy comparison.
The baseline algorithms results show that
all algorithms are not performing good when
it comes to tackling the type 2 errors; the
False Negatives (FN). The high values of
the FN are not right from the digital foren-
sic perspective too, as they allow actual ev-
idence files to slip through the investiga-
tor’s scrutiny as innocuous files. However,
the False Positives (FP), called type 1 er-
rors in ML terms, on the other hand, could
also be problematic for digital investigator
as they mark innocent files as potential evi-
dence files. However, since all the files pre-
dicted by the proposed ML solution are pre-
sented to the investigator for final decision
making, all the FP would be easily identi-
fied at that time.
The ML prediction could be meaningful
in digital forensics scenario if the FN are
reduced to a minimum. The authors have
applied ‘Bagging’ technique to achieve the
same goal; which is explained in the subsec-
that hold redundant information; like the 
columns ‘Full Path’, ‘Item Path’, and ‘True 
Path’ have the same content. The authors 
removed such types of columns as well, and 
reduced the set of columns to 55 (refer table 
1 for details). The 56th column ‘IsEvidence’ 
is populated by the values received from the 
digital forensic examiners. The value ‘1’ in 
the column means that the file is potential 
evidence in the given case, and a ‘0’ means 
it is not.
6.1.3 Experiments and results
The authors conducted experiments on the 
dataset using various baseline algorithms, 
that include promising Machine Learning 
(ML) algorithms suited for two class clas-
sification, results of which are presented in 
the next section.
Digital forensic investigation process aims 
to capture all potential pieces of evidence, 
and could not afford to lose any possible ev-
idence that may slip through the investiga-
tor’s scrutiny as a benign file. The similar 
scenario happens in the ML results, where 
the False Negatives (also called Error type 2 
in ML) are the files that are actually poten-
tial evidence files but have been wrongly pre-
dicted as innocuous. Considering the harm 
that False Negatives values can have on the 
outcome of the investigation, the authors 
used the technique of ‘Bagging’ to reduce 
their values. Results of the same are pre-
sented in the next section.
Experimental protocol: The authors di-
vided the dataset into training and testing 
in the proportion of 80% and 20% respec-
tively. Hence the training dataset contains 
9,692 records, and the testing dataset in-
cludes 2,423 records.
6.1.4 Baseline performance
The authors have used some popular ML al-
gorithms which are known to be good per-
formers on the two-class classification prob-
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Table 2. The baseline performance of various ML algorithms on the dataset.
Algorithm
Confusion
Matrix
Confusion
Matrix Format
Accuracy EER
Support
Vector
Machine
28 28 TP FN
98.37 0.1071
12 2379 FP TN
Two-Class
Logistic
Regression
36 20 TP FN
98.81 0.0954
9 2382 FP TN
Two-Class
Locally-
Deep SVM
7 49 TP FN
97.67 0.2857
8 2383 FP TN
Two-Class
Decision
Forest
0 56 TP FN
97.75 0.1045
0 2392 FP TN
Two-Class
Decision
Jungle
0 56 TP FN
97.75 0.2592
0 2392 FP TN
Two-Class
Neural
Network
44 12 TP FN
97.96 0.0954
38 2353 FP TN
Two-Class
Boosted
D-Tree
44 12 TP FN
99.31 0.0276
5 2386 FP TN
tion 6.1.6.
6.1.5 Relevance score
As mentioned in the mathematical formu-
lation section 5.1.4, the framework would
present the potential evidence files, sorted
in order of their relevance score, to the in-
vestigator. The framework uses the ‘scored
probabilities values’ as the relevance score
for a particular file (the table 3 shows some
examples of the same).
In the table 3, the second column ‘IsEvi-
dence’ is the labeled column which belongs
to the input dataset (AFD). The third col-
umn contains the scored values predicted
by the trained ML model (here, the SVM
model). The fourth column holds the respec-
tive probability scores with which the ML
model has predicted the classification.
It can be observed from the table that the
entry 5, is a False Positive (FP); a non-
evidential file marked as potential evidence.
Whereas, the entries 7 and 8 are False Neg-
atives (FN); actual evidence files marked as
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Figure 6. The ROC for baseline algorithms.
Table 3. The relevance scores of files.
S. No IsEvidence Scored Labels Scored Probabilities
1 1 1 0.9996124506
2 0 0 0.0007406375
3 0 0 0.0027789336
4 1 1 0.9765605330
5 0 1 0.9028829932
6 0 0 0.0036880332
7 1 0 0.1220335960
8 1 0 0.0965592340
gation. Hence the authors resorted to ‘Bag-
ging’ technique to reduce the same.
benign ones. The baseline implementation 
results show large numbers of FN, which are 
not suitable for the digital forensic investi-
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Table 4. The performance of ‘Bagging’ on the dataset.
Number of
Classifiers
Confusion
Matrix
Confusion
Matrix
Format
Accuracy EER
15
49 3 TP FN
91.5 0.0599
203 2168 FP TN
30
50 2 TP FN
91.79 0.0627
197 2174 FP TN
45
50 2 TP FN
90.3 0.0585
233 2138 FP TN
60
47 5 TP FN
91.62 0.0606
198 2173 FP TN
75
51 1 TP FN
86.83 0.0611
318 2053 FP TN
6.1.6 Bagging
The ML technique ‘Bagging’ solves a given
problem by creating multiple weak ML mod-
els that take almost equal portions of posi-
tive and negative label samples for training.
Once ready, all these ML models give their
respective predictions for a given test sam-
ple. The final decision on that sample is
taken through a majority voting over all of
these predicted values.
The authors took a 40 to 60 ratio of pos-
itive to negative labeled samples (selected
with replacement) to train the groups of two-
class classifiers using the Neural Networks
ML algorithm. The authors tried with five
different group sizes, namely 15, 30, 45, 60
and 75; and tested these groups of classifiers
to predict for the current case. The results
of these ‘Bags’ of classifiers are provided in
the table 4. The ROC curves correspond-
ing to bag-level results are presented in the
figure 7.
It can be observed from the confusion ma-
trix of these groups that the False Nega-
tives (FN) have been reduced to low values;
for example, the FN for the ‘75-Classifiers’
group is just 1. Although the accuracy value
for the classifier groups varies, the authors
observed that the ‘45-Classifiers’ group gives
the best performance in terms of a low FN
(2), a low EER (0.0585), and reasonably high
Accuracy (90.3).
6.2 Determining the privacy
quotient: Clustering
After creating a prototype ML model for pre-
dicting the evidential relevance of files, the
authors also implemented another ML model
that could cluster files based on their privacy
quotient.
The clustering implementation aims to
segregate all files present in the input digital
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Figure 7. The ROC for the bagging approach.
prototype implementation, the authors has
assumed all media files (pictures and multi-
media category) as PF, all documents files
as PCF, and rest of the files as NPF.
6.2.2 Dataset processing
The ML clustering algorithms use higher lev-
els of numerical calculations in the back-
ground, before they could assign a cluster-
ing label to given entries; hence they prefer
more numeric valued columns in the input
datasets.
The current dataset (introduced in the pre-
vious sub-section 6.1.2) has a plentiful of
string-valued columns like ‘Category’, ‘Ex-
tention’, ‘Full-Path’, ‘SignatureTags’, and
others. So, in order to get fruitful cluster-
forensic image into different classes. These 
classes can then be labeled as either Private 
Files (PF), PII Containing Files (PCF), or 
Non-Private Files (NPF).
6.2.1 Dataset
The authors have used the same digital 
forensic image as discussed in the section 6.1; 
which is the ‘Hacking-Case’, available on the 
CFReDS website (CFReDS, acc. Mar’18).
The authors have used the same dataset 
for the privacy ML prototype implementa-
tion. Since the ‘Hacking Case’ is a generated 
case which has been developed by CFReDS 
for training purposes, it does not have much 
private information that could be clustered 
out. Hence, for the sake of simplicity and
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ing results, the authors carried out data-
manipulation and transformation for sev-
eral non-numeric columns. For example,
the authors changed the string-valued binary
columns (containing ‘TRUE’ or ‘FALSE’
values) into binary-valued columns (‘1’ for
‘TRUE’, and ‘0’ for ‘FALSE’ ). The columns
in the binary category of table 1 with names
like ‘IsDisk B’, ‘IsDuplicate B’, and ‘IsPic-
ture B’ are examples of the same.
For feeding data to clustering algorithms,
the authors dropped some columns from
the input dataset which were not helping
with the clustering process. The insights
about which columns should be dropped,
and which data-manipulation and transfor-
mation techniques should be used came from
extensive experimentation.
6.2.3 Experiments and results
The authors used K-Means and Hierarchal
clustering algorithms for grouping the PF,
Table 5. The data translation of the ‘Cate-
gory’ column.
Numeric
Code
Categories
1 Library
2 Windows
3 Executable
4
Picture, Multimedia,
Multimedia-Video
5
Document,
Document-Presentation,
Document-Spreadsheet
6 None
7 Folder
8 Archive
9
Script, Unknown, Email,
Database, Communication,
Plug In, Internet, Code, Font,
Application
PCF, and NPF files. The authors used a
data transformation on the ‘Category’ col-
umn of the dataset, which maps numerical
values (1 to 9) to the string values of the
column. The above-stated mapping is pro-
vided in the table 5.
Table 6. The K-Means clustering results.
Purity of cluster Dominating class
0.677364865 1
0.999285204 4
0.553819444 1
0.487112046 2
0.461617195 2
0.321135991 6
0.993489583 7
0.682042834 1
0.707509881 1
For the k-means clustering to work, every
potential cluster should have between 5% to
35% of the sample population respectively.
Since the number of samples in NCF are
more than 35% of total samples, the authors
segregated the NCF into seven sub-groups (7
numeric codes in total). Also, since all me-
dia files are in PF, the authors assigned one
numeric code (code-4 ) to them. All the doc-
uments files are in PCF are assigned one nu-
meric code (code-5 ). Therefore, the authors
chose nine numeric codes for data transla-
tion as mentioned in table 5. The segrega-
tion keeps the labeled samples in check and
clustering algorithm is able to perform bet-
ter.
All the clustering experiments aim to get a
maximum purity value for code-4 and code-5
groups. The ‘purity’ of a particular cluster
with respect to an input class refers to the
probability with which the samples of that
class map into that cluster after clustering.
The higher the purity value, the better is the
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Figure 8. The t-SNE plot for K-Means clustering results.
Table 7. The Hierarchical clustering results.
Purity of cluster Dominating class
1 9
1 9
1 7
0.923076923 9
1 9
1 9
1 9
1 9
0.254199420 1
chical clustering was not able to clearly dis-
tinguish either code-4 (PF) or code-5 (PCF)
clustering result for that class.
The results of the k-means algorithm are 
shown in table 6. It can be noticed that 
the purity of code-4 (PF files) in cluster 2 
is ‘0.9992’ (very close to 1 ). However, the 
clustering results for code-5 (PCF) are not 
so good, as there is not a single output clus-
ter where code-5 dominates the results.
The same results can be visualized in a 
better way using the t-SNE plot (a dimen-
sionality reduction method); which is shown 
in the figure 8. Here, the second cluster 
which is dominated by code-4 (class-4) can 
be seen as a dark patch in the top center of 
the plot.
However, when the authors applied hier-
archical clustering on the same dataset, the 
results were not so encouraging. The hierar-
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in any of the nine output clusters. The re-
sults for hierarchical clustering are stated in
table 7.
7. SECURE LOGGING
SYSTEM
The logging process ensures that all opera-
tions from the starting state in the proposed
framework (refer the flowchart in figure 1)
till the state when the investigation stops
are recorded. The logging also ensures that
all actions of the examiner starting from the
time when she begins the analysis process
till all conclusive evidence get identified are
listed. All system operations and investi-
gator actions need logging because of two
reasons; firstly, to resolve conflicting situ-
ations like allegations of data privacy vio-
lations; secondly, for studying investigation
styles of examiners for learning and training
purposes.
The logging system could fulfill both of
the above-stated requirements only when the
logs are complete as well as tamper-proof.
The first requirement of completeness, which
is relatively easy to achieve, refers to logging
all activities of the system and the investi-
gator.
However, the second requirement of en-
suring that the logs become tamper-proof is
a difficult problem. The first possible solu-
tion could capture the activity logs with the
help of a dedicated application running on
the forensic system. This solution assumes
that the examiner is cooperative and hon-
est enough not to interfere with the logging
application. After the investigation process
is complete, the logging application should
transfer the logs to an external storage place
which is safe from tampering. Any tamper-
ing attempt during its operation would cause
the application to stop prematurely, invali-
dating the captured logs.
The second possible solution should try to
capture examiner’s activities at the operat-
ing system level (with a system level applica-
tion or module) and save the logs in a safe lo-
cation. The safe storage for these logs could
either be a hardened local server or a reli-
able cloud space where the investigator has
no chance of tampering with them Barik et
al. (2007).
Since the investigator may be required
to explain her actions in case any privacy
breach or some foul play is either doubted
or reported. The secure logging fixes the ac-
countability of the investigator for her ac-
tions, in case such a situation arises.
8. RELATED WORK
A digital forensic process model denotes the
way in which an investigation should proceed
from the time of first response, to an incident
till the investigation is completed. It acts as
a user manual for the investigators, to guide
them on how to collect and analyze potential
evidence from devices.
8.1 Data privacy protection in
Digital Forensics
Although there are plenty of digital forensic
process models discussed in digital forensic
literature, only a few incorporates privacy
of data into the digital forensic investigation
process. There are some excellent papers
that have provided solutions to the data pri-
vacy protection problem in the digital foren-
sic scenario. However, their solutions are ei-
ther designed for a specific environment and
not generic in nature; or the privacy pro-
tection works as a separate module that has
performance implications.
Staden (2013) proposes a framework that
protects the privacy of third party during a
digital forensic investigation with the help of
a profiling and filtering mechanism. Depend-
ing on the sensitivity of data being queried,
c© 2019 ADFSL Page 39
JDFSL V14N2 DF 2.0: An automated, privacy preserving, and efficient DF framework
ing setting. Guo, Jin, and Huang (2011) put
forward generic privacy policies for network
forensic investigations.
Croft and Olivier (2010) have proposed a
mechanism where data is compartmentalized
into layers of sensitivity, less private data
on lower layers and highly private data on
higher layers. Investigator’s access to private
information is controlled by initially restrict-
ing his access to the lower layers first. The
investigator is required to prove his knowl-
edge of the low-level layers, to get access to
higher level information.
The Df 2.0 framework ensures that the
data privacy protection is incorporated into
the digital forensic model and hence does not
have any impact on the efficiency of the in-
vestigation process.
8.2 Next generation of digital
forensics
The subsection discusses some notable re-
search works that proposed the next level of
digital forensics. They either incorporated
high levels of hardware performance or ad-
vocated the use of automation as a perfor-
mance enhancement measure; or both.
Ayers (2009) enlists the limitation of the
first generation of digital forensic tools that
are struggling with the huge volumes of data
involved in modern day investigations. The
author proposes several parameters to mea-
sure efficiency, together with the require-
ments that need to be incorporated into the
second generation of digital forensic tools.
The author also proposed processing archi-
tecture of second generation tools which uti-
lizes Beowulf clusters, supercomputers, dis-
tributed systems, and grid computing. The
evidence storage, workflow management and
software reliability of the second generation
tools are also discussed. The paper provides
requirements and high-level characteristics
of the system that was under development.
a decision is taken whether the data should 
be presented to the examiner or not. The 
paper focuses on enhancing the privacy in 
multi user environments,that are subjected 
to post incident investigations.
Dehghantanha and Franke (2014) have 
defined the same as a cross-disciplinary 
field of research and named it as ‘privacy-
respecting digital investigation’. They also 
talk about the present challenges and oppor-
tunities that the field has to offer.
Aminnezhad et al. (2012) state that dig-
ital forensic investigators face a dilemma 
whether they should protect suspects’ data 
privacy or achieve completeness in their in-
vestigation. The paper also states that there 
is a lack of awareness among professional dig-
ital forensic investigators regarding suspects’ 
data privacy, which could result in an unin-
tentional abuse. There have been attempts 
to protect data privacy during digital foren-
sic investigation using cryptographic mech-
anisms. Law et al. (2011) have proposed a 
way to protect the data privacy using en-
cryption. The authors talk of encrypting 
data set on an email server and indexing 
the case related keywords, both at the same 
time. The investigator gives keyword input 
to the server owner, who has the encryption 
keys, to get back the emails that contain the 
keyword.
Hou, Uehara, Yiu, Hui, and Chow 
(2011b) propose a mechanism to protect 
the privacy of data on third party service 
provider’s storage center form the investiga-
tor using homomorphic and commutative en-
cryption. At the same time, the mechanism 
also ensures that the service provider does 
not get to know the queries that were fired 
by the investigator. Hou, Uehara, Yiu, Hui, 
and Chow (2011a) talk of a similar solution 
on a remote server.
Shebaro and Crandall (2011) use Iden-
tity Based Encryption to carry out a network 
traffic data investigation in privacy preserv-
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Garfinkel (2010) also talks about the
requirement for data standardization and
modular mechanisms in the field for digital
forensics and digital forensic research.
Van Baar et al. (2014) have brilliantly
moved the digital forensic processing on a
cloud where high-end machines could speed
up processing and help different actors in-
volved in a digital forensic investigation to
collaborate on a particular case.
Carrier, Spafford, et al. (2005) proposed
a way to automate searches in digital foren-
sic investigations. Richard III and Roussev
(2006) suggested a way to handle large-scale
digital investigations with the use of dis-
tributed computing. They proposed the use
of a cluster of distributed computers to fa-
cilitate processing and store the images and
results at a central data store. The authors
suggested the use of automation by all foren-
sic tools so that they may handle the chal-
lenges of tomorrow.
Abbott, Bell, Clark, De Vel, and Mohay
(2006) proposed an automated way to corre-
late events for digital forensic investigation.
The authors also demonstrate implementa-
tion using publically available digital foren-
sic scenarios and data.
9. CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK
The authors have proposed a new digital
forensic framework that brings efficiency in
digital forensic processing with the help of
automation while preserving data privacy for
the suspect. The framework ensures that
the automation supports a range of digi-
tal forensic software tools and produces ef-
fective outcomes by incorporating the cur-
rent case information, case profile data, the
knowledge of experienced digital forensic in-
vestigators. The investigator is presented
with the most relevant evidence that are
sorted with the help of machine learning al-
gorithms. The framework balances the in-
vestigative requirements of the case with the
data privacy protection of suspect’s foren-
sically irrelevant private files. The frame-
work ensures that the efficiency of investiga-
tion is enhanced, without compromising on
the outcomes of the investigation or affect-
ing the investigative powers of the examiner.
However, since the system is securely log-
ging all actions of the investigator, she expe-
riences a greater sense of accountability for
avoiding unwanted data privacy violations.
The automation and secure logging encour-
age a better validation check, hence bringing
a higher level of transparency into the inves-
tigation process.
The current work also exhibits a proto-
type ML implementation that predicts the
evidential relevance of a given file that is
present in the forensic image of a case un-
der investigation. The algorithm predicts
whether a given file is potential evidence or
not. The prediction task has been modeled
as a supervised learning problem (two-class
classification) where the ML algorithm aims
first to get training on a labeled dataset, fol-
lowed by making predictions on the records
of the testing dataset. Firstly, the per-
formance of seven baseline ML algorithms
was tested on the CFReDS’s ‘Hacking Case’
dataset ((CFReDS, acc. Mar’18)). In spite
of giving a reasonable accuracy the results
from these seven algorithms show a high
rate of False Negatives, which is not accept-
able in the digital forensic investigative sce-
nario. So, the authors used the ‘Bagging’
technique, that takes the predictive decision
by taking a majority voting over the predic-
tions of a bunch of weak machine learning
models that are trained on small portions of
nearly equal parts of positive and negative
labeled samples from the dataset. The use of
bagging significantly reduced the number of
False Negatives, making the ML predictions
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2018; the authors would also like to incorpo-
rate all privacy compliance measures into the
DF 2.0.
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APPENDIX
A: The Hacking Case Questionnaire
1. What operating system was used on the computer?
2. When was the install date?
3. What is the time-zone settings?
4. Who is the registered owner?
5. What is the computer account name?
6. What is the primary domain name?
7. When was the last recorded computer shutdown date/time?
8. How many accounts are recorded (total number)?
9. What is the account name of the user who mostly uses the computer?
10. Who was the last user to logon to the computer?
11. A search for the name of “Greg Schardt” reveals multiple hits. One of these proves that
Greg Schardt is Mr. Evil and is also the administrator of this computer. What file is
it? What software program does this file relate to?
12. List the network cards used by this computer. This same file reports the IP address
and MAC address of the computer. What are they?
13. Find some ‘installed programs’ that may be used for hacking.
14. What is the SMTP email address for Mr. Evil?
15. List some newsgroups that Mr. Evil has subscribed to?
16. A popular IRC (Internet Relay Chat) program called MIRC was installed. What are
the user settings that was shown when the user was on-line and in a chat channel?
17. This IRC program has the capability to log chat sessions. List some IRC channels that
the user of this computer accessed.
18. Ethereal, a popular “sniffing” program that can be used to intercept wired and wireless
Internet packets was also found to be installed. When TCP packets are collected and
re-assembled, the default save directory is that users ‘My Documents’ directory. What
is the name of the file that contains the intercepted data?
19. Viewing the file in a text format reveals much information about who and what was
intercepted. What type of wireless computer was the victim (person who had his Internet
surfing recorded) using?
20. How many files are actually reported to be deleted by the file system?
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